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Submitted: 2 hours ago
Guest
Pig Butchering Scam
I’ll tell my story later in this post. The money I lost was the limit I set going into this, so I am okay. I want to now help prevent others from potentially losing their life savings to this possible pig butchering. Currently they are launching a New Token – CIX – on VZND.com today or tomorrow. I uploaded a screenshot of the webpage earlier in this questionnaire. This fits the classic pig butchering escalation pattern: • After fattening the victim with fake profits on the main platform (VZND.com in this case), scammers introduce a "new exclusive launch" or "VIP token" like CIX. • They hype massive scale (e.g., aiming for ~490 million CIX tokens subscribed at ~$1.8964 each, which would imply fundraising on the order of nearly $1 billion USDT—completely unrealistic for a legitimate new token without major institutional backing and transparent audits). • Promises of huge ROI, early access, or "guaranteed" gains follow, pressuring quick deposits to "secure your allocation" before a supposed public launch or price pump. Key reasons this screams scam: • No credible, verifiable evidence of a legitimate CIX token launch tied to VZND.com shows up in public crypto sources, major exchanges, CoinMarketCap listings (beyond unrelated older projects like Centurion Invest's CIX, which itself has scam complaints and low credibility), blockchain explorers, or recent news as a hot new 2026 token. • Legitimate token launches (e.g., via ICO/IDO, fair launch, or VC-backed) don't involve random personal contacts pushing subscriptions for hundreds of millions in USDT via shady platforms. Real ones are announced publicly with whitepapers, audits (e.g., Certik), team dox, and listings on reputable DEXs/CEXs first. • The scale (~$930M+ implied raise at that price) is absurd without massive hype/pre-announcements—compare to real big launches; even top ones rarely hit that privately/subscription-style without red flags. • Pig butchering ops frequently rotate "new" fake tokens or platforms to keep victims depositing more (often requiring "upgrades," "fees," or "taxes" to withdraw, leading to total loss). I got into this mess by replying on Twitter to NoLimitGains (who has 1.3 Million followers) who said" Btw, if you want my $0-$1M guide, comment "Guide" and check your DMS" on January 19. My reply has been erased as has the Direct Message from NoLimitGains that had me thinking I was receiving trading advice from NoLimitGains. The DM directed me to link up with “Nathan” on WhatsApp with the phone number listed elsewhere. I was later told to contact “his assistant Isabella” who handles “finances” on WhatsApp with the 216 phone number listed elseswhere. Nathan directed me to send funds to VZND where he helped me more than “triple” my account mostly through short term 3–5-minute options on BTC ("Second Contracts"). His hit rate was about 75%. The goal was to make enough funds – 100,000 USDT to buy into the NDX subscription. I did not quite reach 100,000 USDT but was still allowed to subscribe. On March 2, ZeroHedge published a February 27 Bitcoin Magazine article on pig butchering scams describing exactly what I had experienced. I called the Scam Center Task Force hotline at heir 202 Area Code number on March 2 and March 4, leaving a message briefly describing my experience with VZND and NDX. I have not heard back from them. I also filed an IC3 complaint on March 11. NDX’s price is now listed at almost 10 times my buy in price, but I now have to pay 10% “miner’s fees” to sell. When I told Nathan I had no more money, he offered to front me the fees if I would pay him $3,000 of the commission I will owe him once I realize the profits from the sale of NDX. That's where we stand. The best thing I can do now is to get the word out so that others will not fall for this and perhaps lose their life savings.
Submitted: 5 hours ago
Guest
Contract Exploit
I was the victim of a smart contract approval exploit on the Arbitrum network. On March 19, 2026, I created a liquidity position on Uniswap (USDC/USDT pair), followed by an additional liquidity increase on March 20, 2026, bringing the total position value to approximately $40,000. Relevant transactions: - Liquidity creation: 0x23c78cd1cc33603ed706160cdc7e62046fb44793226763abb9127b94d96c1e99 - Liquidity increase: 0x8f062d2d441ee4b963a8830416010101bb8ce60b8a4b76ea351c180f54d446bf Subsequently, a malicious approval was executed, granting a contract permission to manage assets: - Malicious approval (Permit2): 0xd37e17741efeb70556b480e59c64f8a2a999ce1fbbd2737c32a0b32e89ac44cb Following this approval, my Uniswap liquidity position NFT was transferred out of my wallet without my authorization: - Unauthorized NFT transfer (exploit event): 0xf9f4469b02ce01894aa338dc1a292f288e92f2060bfdb73874ab845cbdd11fc1 After gaining control of the LP NFT, the attacker executed liquidity removal functions (DecreaseLiquidity and Collect), effectively draining the entire position. The attacker-controlled address involved: 0x5b6fD5C3Bd1F18210625e997eE4826C55e14E739 The total funds extracted are estimated at approximately $39,141.92 (thirty-nine thousand one hundred forty-one dollars and ninety-two cents). This incident is consistent with a smart contract approval exploit, where a malicious contract was granted spending authority and used that permission to transfer the LP NFT and withdraw all associated liquidity. Importantly, I did not interact with any suspicious or unknown links. I have reviewed my browser (Chrome) history at the time of the incident and confirmed that I only accessed previously saved and verified official websites (including Uniswap). No phishing links or unknown domains were accessed. There is no indication of private key compromise. The attack was executed entirely through smart contract authorization mechanisms.
Submitted: 11 hours ago
Guest
Fake Project Investment Scam
The suspect saying sweet words to catch the hearts, promoting the trading shits which is illegal sites, invite the target to join, push until the target got influenced by the suspect. give the 1st win to enhance the target’s trust, push the target to increase the deposit with big wins offer, transfer some funds to enhance more trust, trigger the target’s panic attack by appearing several issues such as upgrade the account to VIP and suspecting money laundering. when the target got panicked, it’s the suspect turn to influence the target to follow the CS instructions, pushing to get amount expected. keep doing that repeatedly until the suspect and the trading shits achieve a huge amount from each person. when the target realizes that was a scam, the suspect deny it. I lost more than $3000
Submitted: 17 hours ago
Guest
Other Fraud Scam
Scammer reaches out on LinkedIn for job opportunity for a product designer. They send u a girhub invite to critique their work and run current developed product on local host. user then opens terminal and runs the local host giving then access to browser with MetaMask.
Submitted: 17 hours ago
Guest
Other Fraud Scam
Scammer reaches out on LinkedIn for job opportunity for a product designer. They send u a girhub invite to critique their work and run current developed product on local host. user then opens terminal and runs the local host giving then access to browser with MetaMask.
Submitted: 18 hours ago
Guest
Fake Returns Investment Scam
209 usdt + 90 usdt
Submitted: 18 hours ago
Guest
Fake Returns Investment Scam
209 usdt + 90 usdt
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Pig Butchering Scam
I was a victim of a cryptocurrency investment scam. The scammer contacted me through WhatsApp and convinced me to invest in a fake trading platform promising high returns. They guided me to transfer funds from my Binance account to the provided wallet addresses. Initially, they showed fake profits to gain my trust, but when I tried to withdraw, I couldn't, then they told I lost all the money and my balance is shown zero in the fake trading platform wallet. I made multiple transactions to different wallet addresses, resulting in a total loss of approximately 44,160 AED (~12,000 USD). This wallet is part of a fraudulent scheme and is being used to deceive victims. I request this address to be flagged and investigated to prevent further scams.
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Fake Project Investment Scam
This website is scam and promised me to stake bdxn to get bonuses but i discovered it us scam after i sent to it more than 10,000 bdxn ! https://bakerey-swaps.web.app/swap/BDXN/earning.html I watched a video on youtube and it asked me to deposite bdxn on the scam website , this is the video link https://youtu.be/Fi_DkRLupz8?si=pcq07S0su8e4w2Vl I don't know how to recover my bdxn back😔please be careful because can happen to someone else Trx hash is 0xb1416c56fe39adab1ab2bb766e448ceb296241ecb53ab1825c1f29994bef397d The scammer wallet which received my token is 0xc6b194b009ea6b62091b54ac94d80bef5d08fe86image0.png
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Rug Pull Investment Scam
I am a victim of the Ploutos Money DeFi exit scam that occurred on February 26, 2026, confirmed by CertiK and BlockSec.
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Pig Butchering Scam
I need help with this as im not very savvy to the technicalities of crypto and dont know where to find the correct info, ive tried requesting help twice now and dont ever get a reply so that I can do this right. I didnt know pig butchering was even a thing and fell right into it. I received a random text one day that seemed pretty benign. We had conversations for a while before crypto was brought up, she proceeded to show me her options trading she was doing and the profits. For a few weeks I resisted, but decided to try it at her guidance, started small and everything looked legit, being stuck in the fantasy of these nice returns I put more in (28k), watched it grow some and then all of a sudden I was told by her that only a certain options trading was available and that I needed to increase my balance to a certain amount otherwise I wouldnt be able to continue, I put in another (50k), she loaned me another 23k (which i later realized was just my money being looped back through), to get to that certain amount, from there everything looked fine trading wise, until I was attempting to pull some of it out, that's when I realized it was all a scam, I was accused of money laundering, had my acct froze for withdrawals and told if I didnt didnt deposit a large amount that my acct would be permanently froze, the amount they wanted me to deposit was equivalent to what I had put in and told me this was a retainer fee, that I would deposit to them, and then they send it to FinCEN, for which I contacted FinCEN, and they say they do no such thing. So now im on this fake website, with usdt transferred to it through my wallet and no way of getting it back I dont think. It imo a pretty elaborate scam
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Fake Returns Investment Scam
A company so called SGM had us do some activities to upload screenshots of the likes we did on social media with a promise to pay us biweekly. It was like a pyrammid schme. After we uploaded a lot of cash they disappeared.
Submitted: 1 day ago
Guest
Other Hacking Scam
Title: Wallet Drainer Scam via Malicious Approval – Loss of ETH and USDT Category: Cryptocurrency Scam / Wallet Drainer / Phishing --- Victim Wallet Address: 0x0871480cbB465fBA3dDC05F0aF615642C29D95E3 Attacker Wallet Address: 0x870389502d0a41Fd9916922c8b5BE24801C55B0B --- Incident Date & Time: Approximately 6 days ago (around 22:00 local time, UTC+7) --- Summary of the Incident: I was a victim of a wallet drainer attack after interacting with a malicious smart contract. I unknowingly signed a transaction that granted approval to a malicious spender. Shortly after, my funds were drained without any further authorization. --- Relevant Transactions: 1. Approval / Malicious Interaction (ETH Transaction): 0x2f959981c02c147723bc7a106213a461e8505eeba421f5f2656d1e47a8f7f8df This transaction likely granted token spending permission (approve/permit) to a malicious contract. 2. Unauthorized USDT Transfer (Drain Transaction): 0xf688de177a6d90d42fff4d3efc1d5877cb79db756eea4782ad79e12f115a626c This transaction transferred USDT from my wallet to the attacker’s address using the previously granted approval. --- Assets Lost: - ETH (0.105) - USDT ($1265) --- Attack Description (Technical Flow): 1. Victim connected wallet to a malicious website or dApp. 2. Victim signed a transaction (likely approve/permit). 3. The malicious contract obtained spending rights over tokens. 4. Attacker executed transferFrom() to drain USDT and possibly other assets. 5. Funds were sent to attacker wallet: 0x870389502d0a41Fd9916922c8b5BE24801C55B0B --- Impact: Loss of funds (ETH and USDT) and full compromise of wallet security. --- Additional Notes: - This appears to be part of a broader wallet drainer pattern. - The attacker wallet may be linked to other victims. - Funds may have been moved, swapped, or bridged after initial receipt. --- Request: I request investigation into the attacker address and associated transactions. If possible, please flag this address and any related infrastructure to prevent further victims. --- Evidence: - Victim wallet address - Attacker wallet address - Transaction hashes listed above
Submitted: 2 days ago
Guest
Phishing Scam
I was a victim of a phishing scam involving a malicious DeFi interface that mimicked a legitimate service. I connected my wallet and unknowingly signed a malicious transaction. As a result, the attacker gained access to my funds and removed liquidity from my position. Stolen funds were transferred through intermediary addresses and eventually routed to addresses associated with Poloniex. Main scammer address: 0x00000a6DD63dC29289d08464d7c77AA80a000000 Transaction hash: 0x7d54f4e514eae29f2896c27f34c95062b97603f7f39af934d114bb2d83220cea The funds included USDC, USDT, and WBTC. This was an unauthorized transaction. I did not intend to approve or transfer these funds. I request investigation and assistance in tracing and freezing the stolen assets.
Submitted: 2 days ago
Guest
Rug Pull Investment Scam
Ploutos Money DeFi exit scam occurred on February 26, 2026, independently confirmed by CertiK and BlockSec. The attacker manipulated the protocol oracle, minted unbacked tokens, and drained approximately $1.69M in user deposits. This is the attacker's "Fake Hack" wallet. The so-called hack was proven to be an inside job through on-chain fund flow analysis. This wallet received 182 ETH via a chain of intermediary contracts from the exploit. On March 13, 2026, all 182 ETH were moved to 0x640fb638efcc0868f5e95536678087e14a2e96ab then swapped to USDC/USDT and dispersed to 9+ wallets. Main stolen funds ($1.69M DAI) remain on: 0x7a79b51a813e5a1739335ec9407ce4043574aa98 FBI IC3 and FTC complaints filed. FixedFloat exchange cooperating. All wallets monitored 24/7.